ORDER - PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE July 16, 2021 (2024)

Case

Luis Adolfo Ortiz Lema v. Garik Babadzhanov, Nick D'Amelio, Margherita D'Amelio

Aug 26, 2024 |Torts - Other Negligence (Fire Accident) |Torts - Other Negligence (Fire Accident) |717545/2024

Case

HUSLER, JOHANNA v. KOSSOVITSAS, CHRISTOS ANO

Apr 17, 2013 |Scheduling Judge Trial |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |24587/2012

Case

Dennis Hirt v. City Of New York, New York City Department Of Transportation, New York City Transit Authority, Verizon New York Inc., Verizon Communications Inc., Empire City Subway Company, Ltd., Altice Usa, Inc., Transit Wireless, Llc

Aug 26, 2024 |Torts - Other Negligence (Trip & Fall) |Torts - Other Negligence (Trip & Fall) |717590/2024

Case

LEVITIN, SVETLANA B. v. EISENBERG, MARILYN E. ANO

Dec 02, 2016 |Scheduling Judge Trial |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |703737/2016

Case

KIM, RYANG H. v. BURMESTER, BRETT et al

Jul 15, 2024 |Caloras, Hon. Robert I. |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |714468/2024

Case

ROSA, ISSAC v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK et al

Aug 25, 2023 |Cohanim Lancman |Tort-Motor Vehicle-City |Tort-Motor Vehicle-City |724266/2023

Case

Williams, Deyshan v. Eastern Queens Boxing Club et al

Apr 19, 2021 |Butler, Hon. Denis J. |Tort-Other Negligence |Tort-Other Negligence |708923/2021

Case

JOSEPH-NEUMAN, JODI M. v. ROM, SHIRA M. et al

Jan 25, 2024 |Cohanim Lancman |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |701890/2024

Case

Sophia March v. Moda Apartments (Qcf)

Aug 26, 2024 |Torts - Other (Discrimination) |Torts - Other (Discrimination) |717591/2024

Ruling

GREGORY MOORE, AN INDIVIDUAL VS GEHRY MATERIALS, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV03201

Case Number: 23SMCV03201 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: I The unopposed motion for leave to file a cross-complaint is GRANTED. The court notes that the cross-complaint is likely a compulsory one. Westport will file the cross-complaint as a standalone document within 5 court days.

Ruling

AMIR DEAN VS UZUN WHITE GLOVE LLC

Case Number: 23STCV19314 Hearing Date: August 26, 2024 Dept: 29 On April 19, 2024, the Court continued the hearing so that the parties could schedule and participate in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC). No IDC has been scheduled or conducted. Accordingly, it appears to the Court that the issue has been resolved, and moving party no longer seeks to proceed on its motion. The tentative ruling is that this motion is placed off calendar.

Ruling

JOHN WALTER TEMPLE VS MALIYA ANISE SAANI, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |24TRCV00291

Case Number: 24TRCV00291 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B JOHN WALTER TEMPLE, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24TRCV00291 r/t 23TRCV01583 vs. [Tentative] RULING MALIYA ANISE SAANI, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant Maliya Anise Saani Responding Party: None Motion to Compel Responses to Form and Special Interrogatories (Set One) The Court considered the moving papers. No opposition was filed. RULING The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff John Walter Temple is ordered to respond without objections to defendants Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One within twenty days. The Court orders that plaintiff and plaintiffs attorney of record Michael Kahn, Esq. pay a monetary sanction to defendant in the amount of $466.66 within thirty days. BACKGROUND On January 26, 2024, plaintiff John Walter Temple filed a complaint against Maliya Anise Saani and Bryan Barnes for motor vehicle negligence and negligence based on an incident that occurred on April 6, 2023, on the 405 northbound near N. Rosecrans, Hawthorne. On April 10, 2024, Bryan Barnes filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, implied indemnity, comparative fault, and declaratory relief. On July 9, 2024 the case was deemed related to 23TRCV01583. LEGAL AUTHORITY If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. CCP §2030.290(b). The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905-906. DISCUSSION Defendant Maliya Anise Saani requests that the Court compel plaintiff John Walter Temple to respond to Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One. Defendant asserts that on March 25, 2024, defendant served written discovery requests on plaintiff. Responses were due by April 26, 2024. On June 4, 2024, defense counsel sent a reminder email to plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiffs counsel did not respond. On July 1, 2024, defense counsel sent another email to meet and confer for compliance and included copies of the served discovery requests. Plaintiffs counsel did not respond. To date, defense counsel has not received responses. There is no opposition. The Court finds that defendant properly served written discovery and plaintiff failed to timely serve responses, and thus have waived objections. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Sanctions Under CCP § 2023.030(a), [t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Under CCP § 2023.010, an example of the misuse of the discovery process is (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. CCP §§ 2030.290(c), 2031.300(c). Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a) states: The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. Defendant requests $466.66 in sanctions against plaintiff and their attorney Michael Kahn, Esq. The Court finds that the requested amount is a reasonable amount to be imposed against plaintiff and plaintiffs attorney of record. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff John Walter Temple is ordered to respond without objections to defendants Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One within twenty days. The Court orders that plaintiff and plaintiffs attorney of record Michael Kahn, Esq. pay a monetary sanction to defendant in the amount of $466.66 within thirty days. Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Ruling

Christopher Neimier vs Merced Police Department

Aug 29, 2024 |24CV-00211

24CV-00211 Christopher Neimier v. Merced Police DepartmentOrder to Show Cause re SanctionsAppearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of thecourt at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance. Appearto address the failure to appear at the July 22, 2024, Case Management Conference.

Ruling

JANE HODGES, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF ESTATE OF ROSE MARY OLLISON, ET AL. VS ZEV BROOKS, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |22NWCV00741

Case Number: 22NWCV00741 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: C Jane Hodges, Special Administrator of Estate of Rose Mary Ollison, et al. vs Zev Brooks, et al. Case No.: 22NWCV00741 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 @ 9:30 a.m. #2 Tentative Ruling Defendants Zev Brooks and the Law Offices of Zev Brookss Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two, is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsel, jointly and severally, in the requested amount of $861.65, payable within 60 days. Defendants to give notice. Background This is an action for legal malpractice brought by Plaintiff Jane Hodges (Plaintiff") in her capacity as Trustee and Special Administrator of the estate of her mother, Rose Mary Ollison (Decedent), who died on or about December 20, 2020. Defendants Zev Brooks and the Law Offices of Zev Brooks (Defendants) move for an order compelling responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two. On January 8, 2024, Defendants served Form Interrogatories, Set Two, upon Plaintiffs counsel. (Strid Decl., June 11, 2024, ¶ 2.) No responses were received as of June 11, 2024, the date the motion was filed. (Id., ¶ 4.) As of August 21, 2024, the motion is unopposed. Legal Standard The party upon whom a request for initial responses is propounded is required to respond within 30 days after service of a demand, but the parties are allowed to informally agree to an extension and confirm any such agreement in writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.070, subd. (a) - (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.070, subd. (a) - (b).) If a party fails to timely respond to a request for production or interrogatories, the party to whom the request is directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230, and waives any objection, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The party who propounded the discovery request may bring a motion to compel and the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for production of documents or interrogatories, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) Discussion Defendants initially served Form Interrogatories, Set Two, upon Plaintiff on January 8, 2024. (Strid Decl., ¶ 3.) Defense Counsel contends that multiple attempts were made to obtain the discovery, however no discovery has been produced as of the filing date of the instant motion. (Strid Decl., ¶ 7.) As the motion is unopposed, Plaintiffs are ordered to respond to Form Interrogatories, Set Two, without objection, including objections based on privilege or on the protection for work product. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (a).) For interrogatories, the failure to respond also waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230. Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two, is GRANTED. Sanctions To the extent authorized by this chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose [sanctions] against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process & (CCP §2023.030.) Failing to respond to an authorized method of discovery and disobeying a court order to provide discovery are both misuses of the discovery process. (CCP §§2023.010 (d) and (g).) Sanctions are imposed against Plaintiffs and Counsel, jointly and severally, in the requested amount of $861.65, payable within 60 days.

Ruling

VIRGIL HOOD VS LISA MOONEY, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |20STCV00267

Case Number: 20STCV00267 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: B VIRGIL HOOD V. LISA MOONEY, ET AL. MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Date of Hearing: August 29, 2024 Trial Date: Not Set Department: B Case No.: 20STCV00267 Moving Party: Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. Responding Party: None BACKGROUND This action arises from a motor vehicle accident. On March 6, 2020, Plaintiff Virgil Hood (Hood) filed a Complaint against Defendants Lisa Mooney and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority alleging a single cause of action for motor vehicle. On March 27, 2020, Plaintiff Maria Alvarez (Alvarez) filed a Complaint against Defendants Lisa Mooney, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and Hector Cardona in Maria Alvarez v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et al., LASC Case No. 20STCV12394, and alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence and statutory liability; and (2) negligence. On September 24, 2021, the instant action and LASC Case No. 20STCV12394 were deemed related, and the instant action was deemed the lead case. On April 4, 2022, the instant action and LASC Case No. 20STCV12394 were deemed consolidated with the instant action being deemed the lead case. On June 7, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Karen Moskowitz sitting in Department B at Van Nuys Courthouse East effective June 24, 2024. On July 30, 2024, the Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. (collectively, Counsel) filed and served the instant unopposed Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Alvarez. [Tentative] Ruling The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by the Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. LEGAL STANDARD The court may order that an attorney be changed or substituted at any time before or after judgment or final determination upon request by either client or attorney and after notice from one to the other. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 284(2).) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) An application to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a)), MC-052 (Declaration) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c)), and MC-053 (Proposed Order) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e)). The proposed order must specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action or proceeding, including the date of trial, if known. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) Further, the requisite forms must be served on the client and all other parties who have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) The Court has discretion on whether to allow an attorney to withdraw, and a motion to withdraw will not be granted where withdrawal would prejudice the client. (Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915.) DISCUSSION Counsel has filed the requisite forms under CRC 3.1362. Mr. Kashani declares that after a settlement was reached between the parties in the case, a breakdown in the relationship with the client made it such that the settlement documents could not be finalized. Plaintiff Maria Alvarezs conduct has made it unreasonably difficult for the attorneys/firm to carry out the representation effectively. According to Mr. Kashani, Plaintiff Maria Alvarez would not voluntarily consent to the firms request to be relieved. The Court finds that the motion to be relieved as counsel is deficient as neither the Form MC-052 nor the Form MC-053 set forth the hearing on the OSC Re: Sanctions for Both Counsels Failure to Effectuate Disposition, which is set for August 29, 2024, and which was set prior to the filing of the motion to be relieved as counsel. (07/12/24 Minute Order.) The motion is therefore not compliant with CRC 3.1362. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by the Law Office of Jonathan M. Kashani, PLC; Jonathan M. Kashani, Esq.; and Jason Cole, Esq. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

SHERIF MAKAR VS ZACHARY KELLER, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |23TRCV01656

Case Number: 23TRCV01656 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling¿ ¿¿ HEARING DATE: August 29, 2024 ¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV01656 ¿¿ CASE NAME: Sherif Makar v. Zachary Keller, et al. ¿¿ MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Sherif Makar ¿¿ RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants, Zachary Keller and Bruce S. Keller (No Opposition) ¿¿ TRIAL DATE: Not set. ¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Default Prove-Up ¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) Denied. There is no Statement of Damages, no Statement of the Case, and the Does have not been dismissed. The Court will consider continuing the hearing to allow counsel to correct these deficiencies. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On May 24, 2023, Plaintiff, Sherif Makar (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant, Zachary Keller (Defendant), and DOES 1 through 50, for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence. The complaint is based on the allegation that Plaintiff and Defendant, Zachary Keller were exiting the parking structure at LAX and when Defendant Keller illegally crossed multiple lanes causing Plaintiff to collide with Defendants vehicle. As a result, Plaintiff contends that he suffered, and continues to suffer, damages, including, but not limited to, wage loss, loss of use of property, hospital and medical expenses, general damage, property damage, and loss of earning capacity. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint DOEing in Bruce S. Keller as DOE 1. On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Order for Publication which was granted the same day by this Court. On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Proof of Publication as to Bruce S. Keller and Zachary Keller. Further, on June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed another Proof of Publication as to Zachary Keller. Plaintiff now files a Motion for Default Prove-Up against Defendants, Zachary Keller and Bruce S. Keller (collectively, Defendant). B. Procedural On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Default Prove-Up. On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended declaration of Sherif Makar in support of Plaintiffs request for Court Judgment. To date, no opposition has been filed. II. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure Section 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant fails to timely answer following proper service of process. A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and provide: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (C.R.C., Rule 3.1800.) Typically the Plaintiff will also file a statement of damages summarizing the categories of claimed harm and the amounts claimed as to each, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11, using the mandatory judicial council form CIV-050. There was no statement of damages filed here, such as to given notice to the defendants of the amounts being sought for the different categories of alleged harm. A complaints allegation of general damages alone is insufficient. (Jones v. Interstate Recovery Service (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 925, 929-930.) The amount of the default judgment cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115. (Code of Civil Procedure § 580, subd. (a).) The statement required by section 425.11 is a statement of damages served separately on a defendant in an action to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death. (§ 425.11, subd. (b).) (Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 963, 968969.) As this is a personal injury case, the absence of the Statement of Damages precludes the Court from entering a default judgment in any dollar amount. The purpose of the statement of damages (under § 425.11 or § 425.115) is to notify a defendant of the amount of damages sought where the law prevents the plaintiff from including a specific amount in the complaint. (Id.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (b), a complaint in an action for personal injury or wrongful death may not state the amount of damages. If the Defendant has not appeared in the action, the Statement of Damages must be served in the same manner as a summons (CCP §§ 425.11(d)(1); 425.115(g)(1).) This includes service by publication. III. DISCUSSION Proof of Service of Process: Proof of Service by Posting was filed as to both Defendants on both April 23, 2024, and as to Zachary Keller again on June 7, 2024 for the summons and complaint. The Request for Court Judgment filed on August 16, 2024 notes that the CIV-100 was served by mail on August 16, 2024. Request for Entry of Default: CIV-100 was filed on the same date as the other moving papers. It has not been granted. Prove Up: Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment against Defendants. While the 3rd page of the complaint notes that he has suffered wage loss, loss of use of property, hospital and medical expenses, general damage, loss of earning capacity, there is no dollar amount claimed in the Complaint and no Statement of Damages was filed. Nor is there the required Statement of Damages. Further, the Doe defendant have not been dismissed, which is required before a court can entere a money judgment. The Court has reviewed the Declaration of Sharif Makar filed on August 16, 2024 and Amended Declaration of Sharif Makar filed on August 19, 2024. Attached to those declarations are detailed exhibits evidencing medical specials from each of Plaintiffs treating facilities. But the Plaintiffs declaration under Section 585 cannot cure the failure to serve the Statement of Damages. Because this is a Due Process requirement, the Court cannot enter a default judgment on the record before this Court. The Proof of Service by publication attests that a statement of damages was served along with the Summons and Complaint, but there is no such statement in the court file. IV. CONCLUSION Here, Plaintiffs Default Prove-Up is DENIED as Plaintiff has failed to file and serve a Statement of Damages nor has he dismissed DOES 1 through 50.

Ruling

MARIO LOPEZ, ET AL. VS GRANDWAY CONSTRUCTION, LLC, ET AL.

Aug 26, 2024 |23STCV30154

Case Number: 23STCV30154 Hearing Date: August 26, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: August 26, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Mario A. Lopez, et al. v. Grandway Construction, LLC, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV30154 DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY: Defendants Grandway Construction LLC; Grandway Asset Management, Inc.; Lawrence Chichung Wang, Frederick Chi-Shan Wang, and Shadowcreek Development, LLC RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Mario Lopez, Trustee of the Lopez Family Revocable Trust Dated February 15, 2011 and Courtney Lopez STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a construction defect action that was filed on December 11, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants constructed a residential property with substantial structural defects and induced Plaintiff to purchase the property by concealing those defects. Defendants demur to the Complaint in its entirety. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to misjoinder of parties only and otherwise OVERRULED. Plaintiffs shall have 30 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint naming Grandway I-F, LLC as a Defendant. DISCUSSION: Defendants demur to the Complaint in its entirety. // Legal Standard A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, [o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true].) This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).) The Declaration of Emily Kromke in support of the motion states defense counsel attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiffs attorney on February 6 and February 14, 2024, via email regarding Defendants challenges to the Complaint. (Declaration of Emily A. Kromke ISO Demurrer. ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. A-B.) Defendants counsel attempted to follow up via email and telephone on February 20, 2024. (Id. ¶ 4, Exh. C.) Plaintiffs counsel represented that he would call Defendants counsel back that same day, but did not do so. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendants counsel states that Plaintiffs counsel instead sent a written response, but does not describe that response nor present a copy of it to the Court. (¶ 6.) Defendants counsel then explains that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (¶ 7.) Defendants conclusory assertion is not sufficient to demonstrate a proper effort to meet and confer with Plaintiffs counsel to informally resolve this dispute. However, as an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain the demurrer, the Court shall address the demurrer on its merits. // Defendants Overlength Motion Plaintiffs object to Defendants demurrer as improper because it exceeds the maximum length permitted under the Rules of Court. Defendants memorandum of points and authorities in support of their demurrer is 23 substantive pages in length, discounting the caption page, notice of motion and motion, the tables of contents and authorities, and the proof of service. Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1113(d), an opening or responding memorandum on any motion other than a motion for summary judgment or adjudication may not exceed 15 substantive pages. (Cal Rule of Court 3.1113(d).) A party may seek leave to file an overlength memorandum. (Rule of Court 3.1113(e).) However, an overlength memorandum which is filed without leave must be considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (Rule of Court 3.1113(g).) The Court has discretion to refuse to consider late-filed papers. (Rule of Court 3.1300(d).) Defendants did not seek leave of Court before filing their overlength brief. In response, Defendants contend that the length of the brief was necessitated by the number of parties involved and the effects of Plaintiffs claimed failure to join an indispensable party. Defendants argue that they should not be penalized for attempting to streamline the demurrer process for the Court by filing a single demurrer rather than several. The Court is not persuaded. The Rules of Court reflect the Judicial Councils determination that the procedures it has chosen reflect the best method to ensure the just and speedy determination of these proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court 1.5.) Although the Court appreciates Defendants professed desire to facilitate a speedy determination of this issue, Defendants may not substitute their own decision-making for that of the Judicial Council as to how that desire should be given effect. Moreover, in the context of a dispositive motion such as this, a failure to comply with the procedural requirements risks prejudice to Plaintiffs due process rights. For that reason, the Court refuses to consider the portions of Defendants memorandum which exceed the page limits of Rule 3.1113(d), which encompasses Defendants individual challenges to the third cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, fourth cause of action for suppression of fact, and fifth cause of action for negligence for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiffs Absent Table of Contents and Authorities Defendants object to Plaintiffs Opposition for failing to include a table of contents and authorities despite that opposition exceeding ten pages in length. As Defendants state, Rule of Court 3.1113(f) requires both a table of contents and a table of authorities for any brief which is greater than ten substantive pages in length. Although Defendants are correct that the opposition is defective in this respect, the failure to include these materials does not disadvantage the opposing party in the same manner as a substantially overlength brief seeking a dispositive ruling. // // Failure to Join Indispensable Party Defendants demur to the Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30(d) for failure to join an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whom (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. (Code Civ. Proc. § 389.) Defendants argue that this case is grounded in the construction and sale of a residential property by Grandway USDEV I-F, LLC which Plaintiffs allege was defective. As Defendants state, the Complaint expressly states that Grandway I-F was listed as the owner on the certificate of occupancy obtained October 14, 2021 (Complaint ¶ 16), that Plaintiffs entered into Residential Purchase Agreement for the property with Grandway I-F on May 4, 2022 (¶ 17), that the Defendants, through Grandway I-F, executed a Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement (¶ 18), and that, after the close of escrow, heavy rainfall revealed a severe water leakage problem with the patio. (¶ 20.) Defendants contend that there is a defect of parties in that Plaintiffs have failed to name the entity which entered into the underlying contract. Although Defendants characterize the Complaint as improperly pleading breach of contract, the Complaint is more properly described as asserting a claim for fraudulent inducement to contract through a series of alter egos, including the alleged contracting entity, alongside other related tort claims. (See Complaint ¶¶ 9, 36-44.) Regardless, Defendants argue with considerable force that the entity that signed the underlying contract is a party in whose absence complete relief cannot be accorded, as Defendants contend that Grandway I-F was, in fact, an independent entity with divergent interests and potentially separate liability, and not an alter ego of the named parties. Defendants also argue that the failure to join the entity which executed the sale of the property exposes them to potentially inconsistent obligations and multiple liability. In opposition, Plaintiffs dismiss Defendants contentions as mere speculation and argue that service of process on Grandway I-F is impossible because it is a terminated LLC. Not so. A cancelled limited liability company continues to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions to collect and discharge obligations, and disposition of its property and assets. (Corp Code § 17707.06.) Nor is the Court persuaded that Defendants are merely speculating that Grandway I-Fs absence makes complete relief impossible where, as here, there is a dispute as to the independence or lack thereof of the various entities involved in this dispute, Grandway I-F included. The Court therefore finds that the Complaint is defective because it fails to join a necessary party. For that reason alone, Defendants demurrer to the Complaint must be sustained. Alter Ego Allegations Defendants contend that the Complaint is also subject to demurrer for misjoinder of parties because it does not allege alter ego liability with sufficient factual detail. This contention goes to the failure to allege sufficient facts, not a defect of parties. The Court therefore rejects this challenge to the Complaint as improper. Second Cause of Action: Intentional Misrepresentation/Fraudulent Concealment Defendants demur to the second cause of action for intentional misrepresentation for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Although the second cause of action is titled intentional misrepresentation, the Complaint claims that Defendants concealed the defects identified in the Complaint. (Complaint ¶¶ 19-23, 37.) Thus, the second cause of action is more properly construed as a claim for fraudulent concealment. The elements of fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) intent to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of fact. (Hambridge v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.) Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule. Under the economic loss rule, [w]here a purchasers expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is in contract alone, for he has suffered only economic losses. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988.) The economic loss rule hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts. (Id.) Simply stated, the economic loss rule prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. (Id.) The restrictions on contract remedies serve purposes not found in tort lawthey protect the parties freedom to bargain over special risks, and they promote contract formation by limiting liability to the value of the promise. (Harris v. Atlantic Richfield (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 70, 77.) This encourages efficient breaches, resulting in increased production of goods and services at a lower cost to society. (Id.) Because of these overriding policy considerations, the California Supreme Court has proceeded with caution in carving out exceptions to the traditional contract remedy restrictions. (Id.) Nevertheless, the most widely recognized exception to the economic loss rule is when a defendants conduct constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract. (Id. at 78.) When one party commits fraud during the contract formation or performance, the injured party may recover in both contract and tort. (Id.) Thus, under express authority and well-settled precedent, Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent concealment in the inducement of the sale is not barred by the economic loss rule. Defendants also argue that the Complaint does not plead intentional misrepresentation with the requisite specificity. However, as stated above, the second cause of action is more properly considered a claim for fraudulent concealment, not express misrepresentation. Defendants argument in this respect therefore misses the mark. Defendants demurrer to the second cause of action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is without merit. Leave to Amend When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318). When a plaintiff has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based, the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars. (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to state their claims against a defendant. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment. [Citation.] Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) Here, although Plaintiffs have not shown how the Complaint might be amended to cure the defect in joinder, the solution of naming that entity and serving process upon it is readily apparent. The Court will therefore permit Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint to cure this deficiency. CONCLUSION: Accordingly, Defendants Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to misjoinder of parties only and otherwise OVERRULED. Plaintiffs shall have 30 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint naming Grandway I-F, LLC as a Defendant. Moving Parties to give notice. // IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 26, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

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